Ukrainian political analyst Yuriy Romanenko and diplomat Sergey Korsunsky discuss the transformation of the global security system amid the fragmentation of the world order. The central theme of their conversation is the US national security strategy under the Trump administration and its impact on regional alliances. Korsunsky shares unique observations about Japan's radical shift in defense policy, abandoning pacifism for the first time in 80 years. The experts analyze the formation of new security axes—from Scandinavia to Turkey, the role of middle powers in the new world order, and Ukraine's prospects in creating regional alliances. Special attention is devoted to the Turkish vector of foreign policy, the strategic significance of the Black Sea region, and opportunities for attracting Japanese investments and technologies. The conversation concludes with an analysis of peace negotiation prospects and Ukraine's position in dialogue with the United States.
Crisis of the Global System and America's New Strategy
Yuriy Romanenko: Friends, hello everyone! Surfers, slackers, deviants—we're starting our broadcast. Today we have Sergey Korsunsky as our guest, a renowned Ukrainian diplomat, former Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan. And today we'll talk about the crisis of the global system and many other interesting things. Sergey, good evening to you already.
Sergey Korsunsky: Good evening.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes, we're starting under crisis conditions in Kyiv—half the city has no electricity, everything's intermittent. That's why we're slightly delayed. What I wanted to discuss. You and I preliminarily discussed how you noticed, as did I, that Germany, Israel, and Cyprus are building a regional alliance based on gas. Everyone knows well that there's the Leviathan field in the Mediterranean Sea and a number of other gas deposits. Germany, which found itself in a difficult situation after being cut off from Russian gas supplies and losing Russian markets, receiving restrictions on US and Chinese markets, found itself in a crisis situation that continues to intensify.
Germany is starting to seek ways out of this situation, pushed by harsh external circumstances. And this is probably the formula of problems that forces many countries to radically revise their foreign policy strategies, their interaction with the States, with other countries. Because we can state that 2025 changed if not everything, then the last illusions about the world order having collapsed. Trump simply swept them away with his broom.
In this logic, there's a search for new stability. Moreover, the question isn't even about acquiring something, but primarily about not losing what you have. Especially for developed countries accustomed to the stability formed at Yalta and Potsdam following World War II. And for developing countries, the situation is even worse, because many depend on some mono-product they export, or several types of raw materials. Any change in market conditions is a torpedo that capsizes them.
A search begins for an architecture that allows one country or another to gain stability and find its place under the sun in this world where homo homini lupus est—man is wolf to man. Everyone is at war with everyone. The basic framework of this world, where it's still unclear what kind of world order is taking shape, is the framework national security strategy that Trump's team recently presented. Essentially, this formalizes all those contradictory zigzags we've observed from the United States over the past year.
But at the same time, there's a logic there that shows the time of idealistic constructions has passed. The time has come for hyperrealism, realpolitik in the spirit of the late nineteenth century, the age of empires, Theodore Roosevelt, who Trump, incidentally, also likes. Understanding where the wind blows, because the wind constantly changes. We'll probably start with the first basic question: how do you assess the US national security strategy? What do you see in it?
A Bipolar World: USA and China Without Ideology
Sergey Korsunsky: Thank you for the invitation. This is a topic of utmost importance. If we're talking about any future—short, long, medium—we're forced to acknowledge that the new world order, whose arrival we've been discussing for some time, has actually arrived. This happened significantly faster than we expected. We're entering 2026 with a clear understanding that the world is now governed by two centers, two hegemons—the USA and China. This confrontation will continue for the foreseeable future.
The difference between what we see now and what existed during the Cold War, when it also seemed there were two hegemons—the USA and USSR—is very serious. First of all, it's related to the fact that the confrontation is no longer ideological, the liberal world order no longer opposes communism. Communism in China is different from what it was in the USSR. Communism with Chinese characteristics, which allowed China to become the world's super-economy.
And the United States no longer represents the collective West. This is what's interesting. We're forced to pay attention to their strategies because we understand—now we see a different construction compared to what existed during the Cold War and preceded the collapse of the USSR.
We see two superpowers. Neither has such a belt as the USA once had with NATO, and the Soviet Union with the Warsaw Pact. China has no such equivalent. And the US role in NATO today amounts to: contribute 5% of GDP and defend yourselves.
The strategy they adopted reflects this harsh reality and the United States' desire to remove itself from a world that, as they believe, has been freeloading off the United States all this time. Which, of course, doesn't correspond to reality, but this is their point of view, we can't change it.
The construction they envision is as follows: we're no longer going to impose anything on anyone. We have our national interests, and we want you, all the rest, to clearly understand that we will achieve them essentially unilaterally. We don't care what international institutions think, we don't care what your point of view is. If we need to blockade Venezuela—we'll blockade it. If we need to strike Nigeria—we'll strike. If we need to resolve some issues in Asia—we'll resolve them.
Japan Rearms: The End of 80 Years of Pacifism
On the other hand, we see that China has also committed unimaginable blunders. In particular, it inflated anti-Japanese propaganda to cosmic proportions, for which it has paid the price. Today it's already a fact that Japan has adopted an unprecedented military budget, which actually brought it to 2% of GDP two years earlier than promised. Specific rearmament programs have already been announced, concerning new missiles—both domestic and purchased American ones—multi-level drone defense systems, submarines, primarily naval fleet, plus aviation.
You had before you a country that for 80 years pursued an orthodox peaceful policy. You achieved its abandonment of this policy. Now deal with it. What will the United States get in return? They too, unfortunately, will see a mass of unpleasantness. The question is simply when these unpleasantries will arise and in what form. But they will definitely occur, because such a construction is not balanced.
Below these two countries lies a huge number of medium-sized states. And even lower—a cloud of regional states. In the classics of international relations, there are Middle Powers, there are Regional Powers. This is now the construction, the mess, in which we must see the building of relationships. What's missing is this building of relationships.
Yuriy Romanenko: What you're saying about Japan essentially means that the Japanese have already understood that the Americans are only somewhat present in the region, and if anything, they'll be left one-on-one. Actually speaking, they need to forge their own regional alliances. Just like Germany. Germany absolutely faces the same dilemma, because both Germany and Japan—the axial axis of their security was relations with the States. Accordingly, there's no trust in them now.
People told me on one of my previous broadcasts: Trump will lose or the Republicans will lose, the Democrats will come, and everything can be reversed. But it seems to me that they can't reverse anything anymore.
Germany and Japan: Two Countries with a Common Fate
Sergey Korsunsky: I think that, unfortunately, these changes are actually colossal. You absolutely correctly noted—this is what we must accept as given, that it's Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia—these are two countries that after World War II bore the entire burden of guilt for what happened at that time. Although there was no fascism and Nazism in Japan, there was militarism, and they certainly caused havoc.
But then both countries made gigantic efforts to be a positive example for others. Germany was—and it remains to this day—the energy-economic engine of the European Union, the main driver and sponsor. Just as Japan is one of the main countries helping others in the region, providing assistance.
Both these countries have now changed their policies. One—because of Russia in Europe, the other—because of China, Russia, and North Korea in Asia. You've awakened two countries that have very good traditions of producing excellent weapons, strategic planning, and very thorough organization of military affairs. We understand that this has been in German genes for centuries. It's not just under Hitler—they were before that, thank God, not a weak link in Europe. So they've essentially returned. Thankfully, there's no more fascist ideology. But the understanding that security is primarily in your own hands—that exists.
Now relationships must be built, because it's not entirely clear how relations with the USA will be structured. The USA told Europe that it must prepare. According to what was communicated in various trustworthy sources, they quietly told Europe to prepare—in 2027 we're withdrawing regular armed American forces from Europe. Withdrawing from Europe—that's withdrawing from Germany. They seem to be leaving the nuclear umbrella, but they're withdrawing regular US armed forces units.
The same discussion is going on in Asia: where and what contingent should be. At a certain stage last year, and this year it was still being voiced, that the contingent in Korea needs to be reduced, for example. There was no talk about Japan, but the Japanese understood the message very well. They understood that even if the United States adheres to its defense obligations for quite a long time, ultimately, in case of attack, Japan will have to defend its sovereignty, its territory itself.
Therefore, without delaying a single day, as soon as Takaichi became prime minister—I know this absolutely precisely—they're working on very serious strategic plans for multi-level and echeloned defense, especially of air and sea frontiers, naturally. For Japan this is vitally important. A naval blockade of Japan would mean its strangulation.
We're talking about the fact that combat operations must be conducted at a distance not of 200 miles or kilometers from shore, but a thousand. Because they understand that everything they allow closer—that's already further will be drones, that will be attacks involving landing operations. This is all very bad. Therefore, any aggressor must be kept at a distance of a thousand kilometers. This, as you understand, is a completely different story. Appropriate missiles are needed, appropriate radar is needed. There must be, of course, drones and aviation that can strike an opponent at such distances.
I can tell you—I've been in Japan for five years, the last three months I simply can't believe my eyes. Previously they talked about this quietly, calmly. Now this is the mainstream of policy, and at the same time—attention!—Takaichi enjoys the support of 92% of young Japanese. This is generally unheard of.
Taiwan and Japan's Strategic Interests
Yuriy Romanenko: Look, then the following emerges from this: if Japan's security strategy is becoming truly global, because they're now forced to think about how to hedge risks related to their dependence on markets for their products, access to raw materials and so on—this means that, for example, regarding Taiwan, they can't let the situation drift, hoping only on the good will of the USA.
Especially since, based on what you're saying, everything looks like they're withdrawing. If they'll be withdrawing troops from Japan, then actually speaking, who will, besides the trusting Filipinos? And even then I doubt there's trust there. Believe that at the last moment the Americans won't start trading with China in the spirit of how they're currently doing with Russia, and Taiwan won't be left one-on-one? And for Japan, in this logic, Taiwan going under the Chinese wing is simply an enormous challenge for strategic communications. Because essentially all their maritime transportation will be very seriously under Chinese influence.
Sergey Korsunsky: Look, indeed, Japan's example and what's happening in Asia—it's very characteristic for us. This is what we'll see in the world very soon—the formation of regional security alliances. Everyone already understands that NATO, first of all, is focused exclusively on Europe. Secondly, it's simply incapable. Look what Hungary is doing in the EU. And imagine if it does approximately the same thing in NATO.
If all decisions are made by consensus and there's no hegemon who will hit everyone on the head with a shovel and say "do it this way," then NATO won't be able to respond operatively. They don't have their own armed forces. Individual countries must make decisions and so on.
Approximately the same in Asia. In Asia there's no NATO, but there are several countries that understand very well what's happening. Therefore, Japan with Australia and with South Korea will definitely build, if not a defensive alliance, then in any case, this will be the closest interaction in the sphere of armed forces and security.
Regarding Taiwan—first of all, measures are already being taken. There's such an island, Yonaguni. This is the southernmost island of all Japanese islands, located 110 miles from Taiwan. Military bases have already been built there, anti-ship missiles have been deployed there, which are intended to meet, if there's a first line of defense, if there's any attempt to blockade the Taiwan Strait.
Most importantly—you're absolutely right—this is the line of communications. But also, besides everything else, if you look carefully at the map, the capture of Taiwan would mean the actual blockade of the South China Sea. The South China Sea is 50% of EU trade. This is generally half the world's traffic of oil, gas, and goods. And, of course, China is fighting with the Philippines for navigation in the South China Sea for these atolls, the Paracel Islands and so on.
If you look at the map again, if you recognize this as Chinese territory, they essentially put up a barrier to territorial waters. These are their territorial waters. If you recognize all this, they simply block the South China Sea.
Taiwan is such a bastion that's really hard to take. Military specialists say this, that the Chinese think it's so easy. Actually nothing of the sort. Its geography, its shores are arranged such that you can't organize a simple landing there. Enormous forces are needed. And Taiwan itself is very well armed. Now, you know, the USA sold it another batch of weapons. This is not by chance.
Literally today there's another member of the Japanese parliament there, former minister Taro Kono. I know him very well. He was in the past both Minister of Defense and Minister of Digitalization. This is an influential politician from the ruling party. And before that there was another former minister. Now there's a flow from Japan of parliamentarians, influential politicians visiting Taiwan. This is all not by chance. There's serious coordination of what to do in the region if suddenly the United States is late.
I don't think they'll refuse support and leave the region completely. Because for the United States—you know this concept "we're an unsinkable aircraft carrier." All of America floats in the ocean on two sides: we have the Atlantic on one side, the Pacific on the other, and you simply won't reach us, we'll sink you.
But if from the Atlantic side there's still all of NATO between them and enemies, then from the Pacific Ocean side there's nothing except Japan and several island states on which US military bases are located. Therefore, the fall of Japan or the blockade of Japan and the fall of these small states, part of which maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, incidentally, like Palau—this is simply China entering the Pacific Ocean. This means there are no more obstacles to the USA. This is a very serious threat. They don't want to allow this.
Therefore, I think that if any of the three US priorities remains, it will be precisely East Asia. But for us this is a question about—this is the same as we can look at other examples. You already mentioned Israel. There are many other examples, very important ones, when medium and small countries find ways to ensure their security not alone, but in alliances, but in alliances with those who are really interested in ensuring such security by joint efforts, and not just signing some formal papers.
In Asia we're observing precisely this, and I'm sure that in the near future, that is, next year, we'll see the formalization of treaties on mutual military assistance between Japan and Korea, possibly the Philippines and certainly Australia. There's practically no other way out.
The Quad, which the Americans cultivated, now, as we understand, doesn't work very well because of the fact that Trump—50% tariffs on India, and the hugs and kisses of Modi with Putin are already not even serious to discuss, because it's a disgrace. But India, although it's a counterbalance to China, will it be a serious participant in the security architecture—I personally have big doubts.
The New Monroe Doctrine and US Strategy
Yuriy Romanenko: Look, in this strategy Trump very clearly states that the key priority is the Western Hemisphere. Close off the Western Hemisphere. The new Monroe Doctrine. But this Monroe Doctrine is specific, because if in that Monroe Doctrine the States simply said this is our backyard, and we don't particularly claim the rest, because they didn't yet have such capabilities and desire at that moment—only under Roosevelt did they begin such full-fledged expansion.
And now we see a different approach. They say: the Western Hemisphere is our backyard, we don't want China, Iran, Russia frolicking there. Here everything must be coordinated only with us. And in Eurasia we have allies with whom we're building relationships in a specific way, because it's good if these are wealthy allies capable of taking care of their own security. And we're somewhere there in hyperspace, loitering, and if anything, we'll throw in intelligence, or maybe a nuclear strike if everything is really bad.
If you look cynically, pragmatically, then everything looks as if the States simply want to close off the Western Hemisphere so that the resources there ensure their transition to the next technological paradigm. They'll have quite enough not to depend on the chaos unfolding in Eurasia. And chaos in Eurasia is part of the strategy where they remain on top.
Obviously, if Japan and China clash, or Germany and Russia clash, or India with China, Gulf countries with Iran—if Eurasia erupts in flames, then some time will pass for the situation to stabilize. And meanwhile the States can resolve the issue of their internal reformatting.
Actually, George Friedman wrote about this in his latest book, when examining the political crisis in the States, in order to then enter again as peacemaker on top, as happened during World War I, then World War II. And thus, cynically it turns out that they're interested in conflicts in Eurasia, because this allows them, while minimizing defense spending, on the other hand, still remaining aside from the fight, to then enter it in the familiar role of resolver and the strongest player who has the ability to preserve their place in the world system as hegemon.
Because before this, as we know, over the last five hundred years the hegemon always changed. There was Spain, conditionally, the Habsburgs, then the Netherlands, then Britain, then the States. And there was always a basic conflict with the country that claimed hegemony—be it France, if there...
Sergey Korsunsky: They have, apparently, now made, in my opinion, a completely mistaken emphasis on leadership, as they believe, in the field of artificial intelligence. They believed in the fairy tale that artificial intelligence is a magic wand that will allow them to essentially put everyone in their pocket through the unimaginable implementation of super-modern technologies.
I won't waste our time talking about what cosmic stupidity this is. I've seen the map. I give students a lecture using this map. The entire territory of the United States must be covered with new nuclear power plants. Gigantic energy resources must be pumped into this artificial intelligence.
But artificial intelligence, besides needing a lot of water and a lot of electricity—it needs data. You understand? Here! You have a dog. You know how it always asks to eat. This artificial intelligence will always ask to eat. It needs new data all the time. If it doesn't have access to global data flows, they won't be able to do anything, no leadership.
Not to mention that the very definition of leadership in the field of artificial intelligence is an oxymoron, because this technology cannot be completed, it will always develop. Therefore, leadership can be in some areas, in some special applications. Someone will find a smarter way to use these technologies in some specific applications. But you can't be a leader in a field—like, you know, leaders in transistor production. Well, the whole world then learned to produce them. The same thing will happen now.
Their policy of self-isolation is doomed, because they absolutely need to have access to data flows in both Europe and Asia. Now, when the race begins, the Chinese want access to the same data just as much. Europe hasn't woken up yet, but Japan has already woken up. A infrastructure is being created here too.
What I like about the Japanese—they do this quietly. They don't tell anyone anything, there are no publications or loud statements. But then it turns out that the government adopted a new strategy for developing artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, put crazy money there. And now, guys, go ahead, create! And the Japanese know how to create, as you know.
Therefore, they'll also appear now on the map with their products. And I even know they already have their own agent, which they'll use. They won't use either chats or other players. They've created their own tool, which they'll switch to. And be sure that this tool will be impenetrable to hackers, because they do all this in the Japanese way. It's all very complex.
In short, I think that the strategy of "we're in America, security, you do what you want"—it won't work. And is it profitable for them to continue conflicts? In a certain sense yes. While they're buying their weapons, while they know how to produce it, and the technological base works—yes, of course, in this regard it's profitable.
But I don't want to switch to the logic of conspiracy theories, because conflict means decreased consumption. The more people fight, the less mood they have, in principle, to buy new houses, cars and so on. This is all what the United States is going to produce. They're not going to produce for the domestic market, they can't provide for themselves exclusively by working for the domestic market. They only have 350 million population.
Therefore, they want the world to buy from them. And not only weapons, but the world must be in good condition for this. People must have money and desire to buy. And if we also remember that the population is aging and decreasing almost everywhere, then we understand that this is a problem.
To say that any forecast based on a one-sided position, on some one point—it doesn't work. We need to consider a complex of security and economic issues. What's very important and what practically no one talks about. I want to draw attention to this.
The Greatness of a State: Not Only Weapons but Also an Idea
It seems to me that the greatness of a state is not only in how many nuclear warheads it has and how capable it is of delivering these nuclear warheads or forcing other countries with some tariffs to submit to its interests. It seems to me that a country's greatness is in its ability to formulate a vision, a concept, a strategy for the future—and not only for itself but for all humanity.
In this the United States was strong throughout the Cold War, when they talked about the liberal world order, about human rights, about how private property should exist and should be sacred. There were principles that were attractive to all states that were either in the communist concentration camp or for states that were developing. One way or another, there was a beacon.
Today there's no such beacon. Today America is alone. What China offers—first of all, it's lying. And secondly, it offers a communist approach. We see this behind the beautiful words about a common future or common destiny. It shows—what common destiny it has now, how it's behaving toward Japan. If it's behaving this way toward Japan, then what can we say about everyone else?
Therefore, this greatness, it must be demonstrated by one of the hegemons. So far this is nowhere close. And who can formulate such a strategy that will be such a new measure of future greatness—this is a very interesting question.
Turkey: A Unique Geopolitical Position
Yuriy Romanenko: Here's a good comment: "China can win with mass and speed, the USA—with quality and integration. The one who scales artificial intelligence in combat faster and cheaper will win." That's one position.
Look, I have another question. Were you in Turkey for a long time? Were you ambassador there?
Sergey Korsunsky: Eight years.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes! So you know this country perfectly, and it's, first of all, our neighbor. Secondly, a great neighbor. That is, it's turned into a serious force over the last 30 years.
Sergey Korsunsky: Absolutely.
Yuriy Romanenko: Actually speaking, Turkey is also another element of the world system adapting to all these new realities. We see that Turkey is conducting very interesting policy, because it's trying to simultaneously have good relations with everyone and at the same time manages to push its interests further and further. Going further into Africa, going further into Central Asia, while having pretty good relations with Russia, which they, to put it mildly, don't really love at the level of historical memory.
Sergey Korsunsky: Can't stand them.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes. On the other hand, with China, with whom they also flirt, because trade and all that. But Xinjiang is a special place for the Turks, and they conduct this line very systematically, as far as I observe their foreign policy.
With the States too we see—from love to hate is one step, because most Turks don't like the States, but at the same time Turkey for decades conducted a special game with the States. And even now we see how they're refusing Russian S-400 systems in order to give the appropriate pass to the States, with whom they have, with Prime Minister Erdogan, very complex relations, starting from Fethullah Gülen...
Sergey Korsunsky: Fethullah Gülen.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes, Fethullah Gülen. The Gülenists. Starting from the Gülenists, who were a very serious problem in relations, and ending with the defense industry, relations with Greece, where the States also play their own game with the Greeks, which very seriously irritates the Turks.
How do you see Turkey's game in this world fragmented by regional alliances? Because this game directly concerns us. I think they're looking at us very seriously. And many of us simply don't understand how serious the consequences for Ukraine and for Central Asian countries, the Caucasus, Southeast Europe, can be from what the Turks do.
Sergey Korsunsky: Thank you, this is a very good and important question. Turkey is one of such very bright examples of how a country practically at 150, if not 200 percent uses its geography, its history, its demographic indicators and many other factors to achieve national interests.
Indeed, Turkey's uniqueness is that—well, first of all, it's already almost 90 million population, it's growing. This is a young population, the country is Muslim, so they give birth to children with pleasure. This isn't a problem. At the same time, they hold the Bosporus, and this is exclusively important for everyone.
The Montreux Convention exists, which limits the entry of other countries' warships into the Black Sea, and this gives Turkey the ability to control so that no one pushes it aside. At the same time, having lost 17 wars to Russia, they of course have such a genetic painful memory of this. That is, they don't like and fear them.
At the same time, today it's a different Turkey, especially after, as they consider and justly so, the successful fight against ISIS in Syria. And most importantly—this is a result to which we perhaps don't attach special significance, but the fact that they made peace with the Kurds—after all, this was more than 40 years of continuous acts of terror and violence. And suddenly that's it! It all ended.
This is exclusively important for Turkey, because this was a very big irritant on its eastern borders. Relations with Iraq, with Syria and so on. Today this issue is resolved.
The fact that the Russians left Armenia, because—and few know that on the Armenian-Turkish border side, from Armenia's side, there were Russian border guards, a Russian flag. Now there's none of that. That is, after Armenia and Azerbaijan, finally, somehow resolved the Karabakh problem, and these peacekeepers left from there. I heard such things that Turkey is going to return with the Armenians to attempts to normalize relations.
With Azerbaijan they obviously have strategic relations, as with countries of the former Turkic world—with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan. But they wouldn't be so confident, they wouldn't stand on two legs.
Let's understand one simple thing. Only two countries in the world are located on two continents—Turkey and Russia. And if you want this state, by virtue of its geopolitics, to stand firmly on its feet, it must stand firmly both in Europe and in Asia.
But Russia shot its European leg—no, it amputated it. And now this colossus will definitely fall. We understand this. The question is—when?
Turkey at first also went—I observed this, because when I arrived, there was still a Ministry of European Integration, negotiations were underway about joining the EU. Then it all stopped, then Erdogan quarreled with them. But today the situation has changed, because Erdogan began to build a more balanced policy.
You correctly said, when in 2016 he bought the S-400, the Americans said: no F-35s. If you're ever interested, I can tell this story in detail, because I was following all this very closely. Now they're telling the Russians: take back the S-400, because we want the F-35.
This is very interesting development, because Turkey claimed—what's the problem? Not just to buy the F-35, that's not the goal. The goal was to make a global hub in Turkey for F-35 maintenance. Imagine how many of them fly from Japan to Portugal, and if there were a hub for their repair in Turkey—that's crazy money, that's participation in programs that would technologically give them the ability to gain access to F-35 technologies. Because the Turks themselves can't build aircraft, except for drones, and even then the question is who taught them.
This country is unique in this regard. It really managed to reach agreements with the Japanese, and Koreans, and French, and produces automobiles on its territory. You can talk about how—someone among us buys a Toyota Auris and thinks it's Japanese, but actually it's, of course, Turkish. But this is that they conducted such diversification. You'll agree, this is simply wise policy.
This binds them with countries—well, they're medium-sized, but no longer the most medium. And they create serious interest of these countries in Turkey. They have very good relations with Japan, very serious relations. And although during World War I they always had some squabbles with Europe, they have many French words in the language. And with France and so on.
And how many millions of Turks are in Germany? You understand that this is power, you can't do anything with them there. This is really huge—there are millions. The last figure I remember—it's 3.5 million. These are serious voters, whatever you want. The same in Bulgaria, for example, they have influence and so on.
Turkey and Ukraine: Strategic Partnership
What about us? Turks will never recognize Crimea, because Crimean Turks are their brothers, this is their blood. And whatever Russia does and however it wants to attract Turkey to itself, Turks will never recognize Crimea as Russian. And this will always be a policy that Crimea must be returned to Ukraine, and then given to Crimean Tatars, Crimean Turks so that this is their land, their homeland in one form or another.
Besides this, they will always support our NATO membership. Why? Because they want to distribute responsibility. When the EU came to the shores of the Black Sea—Bulgaria, Romania—everyone thought NATO also came to the shores of the Black Sea. But neither Bulgaria nor Romania has a fleet at all. Ukraine had a fleet emerging. Then Sahaidachny, as I understand, went out of service, then we had no fleet, and now we've sunk the Black Sea Fleet. For which the Turks are, of course, grateful to us for life.
But we'll have a fleet in perspective. We're building frigates with them, right? That is, these are all links of one chain. It's very beneficial for us to have good relations with the Turks. Not just good, but we have a strategic partnership with them. This declaration was signed in 2011 when I was there, and since then we've been trying in various ways to develop this partnership. It's gone quite far.
But with all this we must understand that Turks never put all their eggs in one basket. They'll always spread them into different ones, and they recognize Russia as an authority and as a powerful state. This doesn't mean anything in the sense that they'll submit to them. Never. They'll get orders, they'll trade with them, but they won't follow their lead, because they know that Russia's sacred mission, if anyone didn't know, I'll say: to return to Istanbul its historical name Constantinople. You understand? And transfer the Ecumenical Patriarchate to Moscow. They know this, and therefore they won't allow this.
The Concept of Two Axes for Ukraine
Yuriy Romanenko: I had—I don't remember with which of my guests—with Petro Kulpa I had such a thesis that back in 2006 I wrote an article called "What Should We Do with Russia? The Concept of Two Axes." I said then, this was in spring 2006, that the conflict with Russia is already existential and war is inevitable, and therefore we need to develop two axes.
One axis—to the north, through Belarus to the Baltic, and the second axis—from Germany, Poland and also to Turkey. That is, we must go south, to the global south and Central Asia. When we talked about Germany at the very beginning, how they're now building through shared gas interests, essentially such an axis. Because they found themselves cut off from Russian raw materials that gave them high margins for their industry.
They're simply vitally interested in this. They need to resolve this issue one way or another. Whether this gas will be American, Qatari or Cypriot—this is a question of how their industry will develop and how they'll feel.
I think that Ukraine and Poland, all these conversations about Intermarium—they'll be fake until the moment we generally understand the entire crystalline lattice in which there are such nodal large powers with which it's necessary to coordinate interests. These interests, restraining each other on one hand, and on the other hand allowing development.
If we could build a coordinated game with Romania, with Poland, with Germany in order to exit through Turkey to the Gulf countries, to Central Asia, to the Caucasus. And a draft would emerge toward China, which, on one hand, would be an alternative to the Russian path that the Chinese tried to build to Europe. And on the other hand, you could link a mass of interesting countries—for example, Uzbekistan to India, exit to Iran. And thereby maximize the opportunities that such a stable crystalline lattice gives.
What do you think, in principle, what's the prospect of building such a game for Ukraine? I understand that in the current situation it's extremely difficult for the ruling class, because it requires enormous intellectual efforts and imagination, as well as simply systematic work. Because you, like no one else, I think, understand that quality, effective diplomacy requires super-efforts and deep integration with the ruling elites of the country where you're located, understanding realities, languages and all that.
But it seems to me that if we don't start projecting our foreign policy there, we'll always be an invalid, because we're simply cutting ourselves off from growing organisms and including regional alliances that are growing and will grow there, it seems to me.
Scandinavian-Black Sea Alliance: A New Idea for Ukraine
Sergey Korsunsky: I'll allow myself to express an idea to which I personally came to this conclusion. I even mentioned this somewhere in articles too. My opinion regarding the fact that Ukraine must find its allied environment among those countries that are really historically, geographically, economically connected with us and can be interested in us, is as follows.
Unlike today's vision of Ukraine as something between something—we're between the wild Horde and the civilized West, we're a frontier country that's always on the border, and all nomads trample over it, running back and forth—and this from an existential point of view—this is a very bad position. I would see it changed to creating a certain space.
You correctly absolutely said, only I see its beginning in Scandinavia and its lower end precisely in Turkey. You're absolutely correct—besides Scandinavian countries and the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey should enter it. Germany can serve as a very important source of support in this regard, because it's also a state that has access to the northern seas, and it's important for them that everything is quiet and calm there. Plus Britain. Historically Britain, and culture, whatever you want, it's connected with Scandinavia. This is historical fact.
We were always part of the route from Varangians to Greeks, and we should understand that this environment—these are countries that definitely understand what Russia is. They've all dealt with it. If you talk about what Russia is with Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium and so on—with all that, of course, these countries support us, but they don't get goosebumps that run when you remember what Russia is.
All countries that are located in this belt from Varangians to Greeks, these goosebumps exist. We all know what we're dealing with. And we all understand that hopes for the quick disintegration of Russia into many very good and sympathetic and friendly states—this is a prospect of the distant future.
Today we must understand that Russia can provoke Norway by landing on one island, it can provoke Poland through Belarus and break through a land corridor to Kaliningrad. However much we say that all this is impossible, this is NATO and so on. We also said it was impossible to imagine what happened on February 24, 2022. We understood there would be some war, but in such a form as it would proceed—hardly anyone could imagine.
I would see such an alliance in this context. At the same time, note that we're dealing, for example, with Norway. I don't know anymore, it's long been over a trillion. Norway's Future Generations Fund exists. They constantly allocate money from the sale of their gas and oil.
The same Sweden—these are very powerful military technologies, and it's very interested, and it's always been interested in maintaining relations with us. You'll notice how friendly, how strongly they support us. Just like Denmark, just like Finland, well, the Baltic countries, naturally.
But those weren't in the USSR. They know what Russia is, and they know that we're their baby, you understand? Therefore, it would be possible to talk with them in such a civilized way, that not just Trimarium, but let's build a real security belt for Europe. And we, Ukraine, will be not a consumer of security, of your help, but we're ready to be a contributor to security. If something catches fire with you, we'll definitely help you, because we understand—this is a common cause.
If we can throw this to the south as well—Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey—then I think such powerful countries along the entire route will give us the ability to have real security guarantees. Because the United States is far away. You understand, they're simply far away. This is geography. Even with the fact that they'll promise us to intervene. For them to intervene requires time, requires resources, and under any circumstances this intervention will be limited.
But if we have a defensive alliance that stretches both horizontally and vertically, and it's clear that these countries themselves have experience and aren't afraid of Russia, because everyone knows: they'll come, they'll slaughter. Finns aren't afraid. Swedes aren't afraid. Norway definitely isn't afraid. And the Baltics. They're now simply all, there, all of Estonia—one and a half million people—they're now training to fight. Because they understand: they'll come, they'll slaughter. That's all. No need to convince anyone of anything.
This would be a very important step. It seems to me this would be such an alliance that would allow, in any case, to resolve the security issue. If the question is about resources, then for us most important—these are ports. We need to trade, we need safe navigation. Therefore, we need Turkey, come hell or high water, so that with its help we can pass through the Bosporus calmly and trade. We need access to seas. We have no other way. We must have access to seas.
Through Turkey, access to Central Asia is, of course, facilitated many times over. I can tell you that Turkish enterprises, in any case, while I worked there, I left in 2016—it's been quite a while, but I think this has only intensified—they were always ready to help us with their connections, being intermediaries, let's be frank. But you can build relations with them, because Turks are born traders, these are those who've lived on this all their lives.
Therefore, they'll very gladly easily get up, get on a plane, fly to another country. These aren't Japanese for you—Japanese are very cautious, Turks are much more easy-going. And you could in perspective, after we ensure ourselves—first, security, secondly, we rebuild the state—and then we can project some positive strategies, messages and experience to those countries that are, we understand, in a state of searching.
Central Asia: A New Field of Struggle for Influence
I'll tell you. Incidentally, you mentioned Uzbekistan. A very interesting trend is appearing now, simply extraordinary. These countries, all five former republics—this was Chinese territory unambiguously. But last year not only were they invited to Washington. Not only were they promised everything there and told everything beautifully. After that they were in Tokyo. And in Tokyo there was a very important reception. Such a speech of all five presidents, especially with Kazakhstan.
You probably saw, after that suddenly Tokayev called Trump. Let's recall, was there ever such a thing in history that the president of Kazakhstan called the president of the United States? I can't remember such a thing. And here suddenly he called, and Trump invited him and the president of Uzbekistan, if I'm not mistaken. But Kazakhstan for sure to the G20.
You think this is accidental? This is not accidental. This is the fight against China. That is, these five republics—now they're trying to recruit them into the Western spirit and give them additional opportunities for development and resources. So that this isn't territory where China. Because if it has them, then look at the map. Let's just mentally estimate—what a gigantic territory: Russia, China and another five Central Asian republics. This is such a mass of land, water and resources that it will be very difficult to cope with.
What's this about? This is about what you and I were talking about. Countries that can't claim independent greatness, some global policy—they must seek the right alliances, they must seek the right allies and do it on time. Do it very clearly so as to enter into such relations that will allow achieving their national interests without greatly compromising their principles. In Central Asia—this is one of those places where I now see where such a process will occur.
Black Sea Alliance: Alternative or Addition?
Yuriy Romanenko: You know, when you talked about how Turkey now has a population already under 90 million, and maybe already over 90 million—well, in any case, it was growing demographically rapidly until recently. Although now demographics there are actually approaching European indicators. When the fertility index is 2.1—that is, at the replacement level. And I think a little more will pass, and the Kurdish factor will also start approaching normal indicators. Because actually now the main addition is given by Turkey's eastern regions, where there are many Kurds.
Why am I leading to this? That in conditions of such turbulence in which the world now finds itself, we see that all sides are trying to close their markets, a game of protectionism begins. It will continue, obviously, for some time, until some other globalization model appears. Because actually you can say that globalization 2.0 in the old format is already wound down and will continue winding down. But then, sooner or later, there will still be globalization 3.0, 4.0. It's a matter of time. I think so.
But meanwhile there will be a transitional period that can last more than one decade. Obviously, the capacity of the economy of one bloc or another and regional alliance determines the stability of such an alliance. And Ukraine will inevitably have to think about which alliance it's in.
What this war showed—it showed that NATO doesn't shine for us. This is already completely obvious, because NATO, you can say, it no longer exists. This is fiction given what Trump is doing. This is, first. Secondly, the European Union—although they don't reject our perspective in words and promise some perspective in the future, but I'm very afraid that—and maybe I'm not even afraid—that we're looking at the Turkish path. When the Turks were promised that you'll be in the European Union, but as they say, the wagon's still there.
Although they accepted the Customs Union there, and this, in principle, allowed them to solve part of their problems. And the construction of the same Toyota car factories was in part connected with the fact that the Japanese thus entered the European market. They were playing a long strategy. And the Turks were playing, and the Japanese were playing.
I've had such considerations for a long time—shouldn't we think about a Black Sea Union? Because, conditionally speaking, the Caucasus countries, Turkey, Ukraine—this is already a market of somewhere under 150 million people. And we have a mass of mutual interests—and not only in logistics, but also in the most various commodity items.
Given the crisis of the European Union, given its fragmentation—possibly, I think they won't escape this either. The same Romania, the same Bulgaria and the same Poland. Quite possibly, they could be interested in such cooperation too. Because in Poland already about 20-25% of the population supports leaving the European Union. A centrifugal process is beginning there.
Since Poles understand that Germany will no longer finance infrastructure projects so generously as it was, and German capital will also be tight-fisted now, because they need their own internal restructuring that will allow them to stay on top at all. Because Germany clearly lost the technological race now to both the USA and China.
What do you think, the prospect of such a Black Sea Union, which actually would go beyond the Black Sea in perspective—how much could we realize such a game?
Sergey Korsunsky: First of all, this is already an idea that was realized in the form of two regional organizations—BSEC and GUAM. And neither one nor the other worked. BSEC didn't work because there's always—since Russia is there, naturally, nothing integration-wise can be advanced, because always, when there's anything Russia isn't interested in, it blocked it. Moreover, it did this very powerfully.
Then there was such a factor there called Armenia, Azerbaijan. Whatever Armenia proposes, Azerbaijan is against. Then there were other factors connected with Balkan countries that also entered there. In short, the organization, having very great potential, the only structure on today's date that they spawned and that works—this is the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, BSTDB.
Incidentally, it received resources from the Japanese for Ukraine and works on this. That is, here there was signing of an agreement between the Japanese bank JBIC and BSTDB for allocating credit resources for Ukraine. But this is the only structure that actually works. Everything else doesn't work.
GUAM, headquarters in Ukraine, on the Embankment—you probably know. And the same thing—although for many years we (this is Ukraine, I mean) made serious efforts to rock this. But again, it didn't work out. Now it's not working out. It didn't work out for various reasons, but now it's not working out because of Georgia. Because Georgia, as you know, their current government—what policy it's conducting—and you can't close your eyes to this.
What's the problem? Why BSEC and GUAM, why the Black Sea Union, despite theoretical various attempts, didn't happen? Because there's no leader, there's no one who will lead all this, as in Europe—it's Germany, France, Italy. So there would need to be someone in the Black Sea region.
Turkey could be such a leader if everyone else agreed to this. But if Armenia is there, it won't agree. And Russia, of course, won't agree. So there are nuances here, because you need to enter into an alliance with rich countries, with powerful countries that don't ask anyone and that have resources to realize their national interests by their own efforts.
And if we all, who require help and external support, try to unite—we'll simply from one supplicant become a big supplicant. Turkey can't be such a sponsor. It can help, it can invest in this, it's interested in this.
I want to give you an example. I worked on BSEC for many years, working in the Foreign Ministry in the economic department. If I'm trying to remember now in what year this was—I think it was 2007 or 2008—and the BSEC summit was held in Moscow. And I went to Moscow to prepare this. Then there came, I think, it was First Deputy Minister Chalyi Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. He came as if to represent Ukraine.
We were sitting, preparing this summit, and the Russians, who were chairing—why in Moscow? Because they were then chairing BSEC. They distributed a map among all meeting participants. A map of a project of a network of Black Sea ports and transport routes between them, which they saw as a strategic goal of development within the framework of the organization.
There were all the ports that you know on the Black Sea, except one. Do you know which? Guess. Except Odessa.
That is, when I saw, I say: "I have a question, how did you manage? How did this happen for you? Just interesting." You put everything: Constanța, Varna, Trabzon in Turkey, of course, Russian ports. How did you manage to forget Odessa?
So now, now I ask myself the question, remembering that case. They apologized, said: "We just forgot. It's an accident." But now I think that this wasn't an accident. You understand? To such an extent it sat in their heads that we shouldn't be there even in theory, even in such projects.
This is what I'm saying, that such an alliance without Russia—well, that is, we need to think how all this will look. But it seems to me we still need to seek more powerful allies. If we're entering into any alliances that can really help with resources and show how to build some policy, how to build energy policy.
Why did the Swedes explain to us why all of Stockholm is heated by heat pumps and spends practically no resources? And why can't heat pumps be installed in Ukraine, although all conditions for this exist? I know the answer to this question, but it would be good if they told us.
They have many such preparations, because these are northern countries, they're cold, everything's expensive—these aren't cheap countries, but they keep the economy in good condition and the social sphere, which is important. Therefore, it really wouldn't hurt us to learn from them. From other Black Sea countries there's less to learn. But still the Baltic-Black Sea corridor I like. And even the Scandinavian-Black Sea one I like better.
Japanese Investments: Hydrogen, Grapes and Technologies
Yuriy Romanenko: You know, my logic is such that such an association gets emergent properties—that is, properties that the individual doesn't have. The country itself doesn't have those properties that appear when a common space appears. Because for Japan, for other major players—European, American, Great Britain, for anyone—when they understand that there operates, conditionally speaking, a common customs space, common security policy and so on, that you don't just get access to a resource—you get access to something bigger.
Market capacity will start to grow. It's easier to defend. Therefore, I agree that you can't get away without the north, without northern Europe. That's precisely why I wrote in 2006 that the concept of two axes—north, south. We necessarily through Belarus to the Baltic and further there to Scandinavia. From Varangians to Greeks didn't appear for no reason in its time. They traveled by ship then. Therefore...
Sergey Korsunsky: Yuriy, look. We have a free trade agreement with Turkey, and we have a free trade agreement with the EU. Actually we're already within the framework of some free economic space. The question is in policy. You understand, we—I mentioned that Turks managed to place automobile production of various different countries on their territory.
I talked a lot with automakers, including Japanese. And I told them: "Well, okay, you produce some Toyota models in Turkey. Why wouldn't you build production plants?" They have very nice, just amazing small Japanese buses with doors that slide sideways, don't open as usual. And they have many such cars with additional devices on which elderly people can ride who have difficulty getting behind the wheel or who have some problems.
We have—we understand that we have what number of people with amputated limbs, how many people there will be who will need these additional—in these small nice cars they have one-liter engines, they don't consume a lot of fuel, they're very economical, and so on. And they're very reliable.
I tell them: "Let's build with us." We have an enormous market, we'll produce such a quantity of cars for ourselves that everything will pay off for you. And they in return asked me what our policy is in the sphere of the market, working on the automobile market.
They told me what quantity we buy second-hand from Europe. This was still before the war. This isn't for war, this is for—well, you know for what. They drove these Porsches bought for 500 dollars. Here. This is one thing. And the second—this is generally, excuse me, a disgrace, when in our country first place by quantity of sold automobiles—Chinese. Excellent! Well done! I can't say anything. The Chinese are great.
Yuriy Romanenko: I have, you know, what thought?
Sergey Korsunsky: This is our policy.
Yuriy Romanenko: I also from about 2006 developed it and will continue to develop, that we need to make in Bessarabia, in the south, generally a large production cluster and move the capital there, make a new global city there, not in Odessa, but in Bessarabia itself. To build everything from scratch. Why from scratch? Because we need to do everything right away within the framework of new technologies.
I already had special views on Japan back then, because we need to sell not just some assembly, but we need to sell immediately a place in the new paradigm. The Japanese in hydrogen, for example, in automobiles—they're ahead of everyone. Accordingly, with the Japanese I would agree that you, for example, tailor all infrastructure in new cities for hydrogen to your automobiles. Accordingly, hydrogen production, accordingly, production of such automobiles, accordingly, their maintenance—this immediately gives you an enormous testing ground and enormous pilot.
The whole world will watch how this works. Accordingly, further this can be scaled to Europe and move already with support from this territory. And we would then attract both money and technology, and we would have a long-term connection, because everyone would understand what their benefit is. And we would also learn a bunch of technologies along the way and get them.
Sergey Korsunsky: This is the right thought. You can do the hydrogen thing, you can do Japanese new batteries. I'm even afraid to name figures, because I still need to be convinced that this is true. Because if this is true, then what they say about them—that they made not lithium batteries, but different ones that have fantastic results, absolutely. If this is true, then we'll forget about lithium, because these will be completely different.
It would be possible—you're absolutely right. That is, we need to create a new territory, open a new zone. A port can be built there, there's the Danube, logistics can be built there. That is, you can talk about the fact that we seriously see. I'm telling you—this is what this is about.
Give, show a strategic priority and show to others—to that country with which you want to work—that you really understand that it has interests, and you're giving a strategic opportunity that closes some market, that closes some very serious niche. Show that we also have brains, we're also ready to be a contributor in all this. This isn't just that you came, built, surrounded with barbed wire fence, your robots work there for you, and we're on the side. We're ready to move.
You know, how surprising it was for me to hear from Apple head Tim Cook, who said that you think we produce Apple in China because there's cheap labor? This is not true. Labor there is no longer cheap. But he says, the truth is that it exists. Wherever we decide to build a factory, infrastructure will immediately arise there, and labor will appear there. Because they understand that this is needed—there are investments that come from outside, and there are investments that support external investments with internal ones.
That is, conditions are created so that labor moves and supports what's being invested from outside. It's not just that Musk built a gigantic Tesla factory near Shanghai. After all, labor was found that will work there. And what, did the Chinese, were they born assembling electric cars?
These are questions that show strategic thinking. We could—incidentally, there, in Bessarabia, you mentioned automobiles—this is a good thought, but no less serious thought—this is to attract the Japanese to our agriculture. You understand, in the south we can grow the same grapes that are already grown.
But if we start growing grapes—I can't even convey to you, I don't have epithets, I don't know such in any language to describe its taste, which they produce. And this grape is very expensive, but it's so delicious that it's bought all over the world. There a bunch can cost 8 dollars one, but the taste is simply unimaginable.
If we gave them the opportunity to those southern lands... Well, water is needed, of course. But again, with appropriate technologies you can provide the region with water—the sea is nearby. And ultimately create an even wider zone that includes not only automobile production, for example, but also production of Japanese strawberries of divine taste, Japanese grapes, Japanese peaches.
This is incredible, you understand? I never thought it was possible to create these products with such taste and such quality. They know how to do this, because genetics, because fertilizers and because proper irrigation. There's no space science, but you just need to know how to do this. They do this.
And moreover, I'll tell you, they're interested in this. Because transporting these products to the European market from there is very difficult. And from Ukraine very close. You could do all this, you understand—put it on a little ship, and in a couple days you're selling.
Such things in complex, they could be interesting for them. But they must be based on the fact that we tell them: the lands we're offering you to develop, they're definitely clean from all sorts of corruption details. They're not pledged in courts, they haven't been resold by anyone. Here, take, come in, take Ukrainian businessmen as partners and go ahead.
That's, that's all that's required. There must be a policy that will show that we as a state, Ukraine, we understand the investor's interests and are ready to really help him. Not with the help of—well, you know, what mechanisms. But with the help of normal, honest—honest partnership and honest interaction.
Because the Japanese will never go for corruption. Not for any schemes, not for any of these things. For them disgraceful shame is to fall into history and then litigate or, God forbid, somewhere else. Only small crooks can fall for this. Serious investors will never in life go for this.
Ukraine and the USA: Prospects for Peace Settlement
Yuriy Romanenko: Let's touch on the States and our relations, but in the context of what's happening with Russia and negotiations about peace. Zelensky is supposed to meet with Trump tomorrow. Trump is already saying he's waiting for the final deal. Well, and actually speaking, we see how they're forcing us to it, because on one hand Russia is playing bloodily.
Today's strike on Kyiv must be viewed through the prism precisely of the negotiation process. We must clearly understand all this. On the other hand, NABU is entering the government quarter and creating the appropriate background for Zelensky's visit.
Well, and actually speaking, I think that now many people's rose-colored glasses about the States and Europe have fallen off, which existed at one time 20 years ago. Even 5 years ago many still had these rose-colored glasses.
How do you see relations with the States? How do you see generally the States' game through this prism of their withdrawal from Europe, partially from East Asia for this reformatting, which we—I don't know, will be successful, won't be successful. I agree with you—the risks for the States are enormous.
Nothing says that they have a filigree game. That is, at the strategy level I understand that this could be realized, but we see that this isn't a filigree game. It's conducted with such bear grabs that hair simply stands on end. How can you even commit such stupidities? And in a year they've made very many of them.
Accordingly, how does it seem to you, including through the prism of their national security strategy? Because Ukraine is mentioned there perhaps even not less than Russia. Because Russia was bypassed in general. It appeared there in the context of South America. It was remembered there in the context of Ukraine about this crisis. Well, and actually speaking, that's all—as if it isn't some significant magnitude.
And China is there—everything. And Europe went as a zone of special interests. But at the same time Europe itself must be subjective. How do you see our relations with the States and Europe in this context, probably also?
Sergey Korsunsky: This is the most difficult question, which, of course, must be considered very carefully. Because on one hand, today, having in mind precisely this horror that happens every night already for, well, probably already about two years—this is some continuous nightmare that can't be stopped by any means, it turns out.
The United States is the only force that could do this. The question is why they're not doing this. And if they still want to get a result, then at what price are they trying to achieve this result?
It seems to me that the plan that was made public—and I, of course, like everyone, read it carefully—it seems to me is the maximum possible at this stage. And I take my hat off to colleagues who conducted negotiations. I think that, of course, we don't like it in many points—very many details need to be clarified to understand still what we're talking about. The formulations are too vague so far. But to really achieve even such a result was difficult.
The question is that the Russian Federation won't accept it. And if it doesn't accept it, will there be any further steps? Since we've been swinging on these swings all of 2025, and this isn't the first time such a situation arises, we understand that we'll now most likely reach some agreement with Trump. I think that there's some—since Zelensky agreed to meet with him again and discuss with him again—probably this is correct in the sense that we need to raise the level of discussion to first persons, and not deal with realtors.
We need, of course, to see and try once more to explain what's acceptable, what's unacceptable. Therefore, this is very difficult, because Trump is a person of mood. Trump most likely our concerns are an irritant, but he's not ready to devote 24 hours a day to this and constantly deal with this. He would like simple beautiful solutions.
In Trump's estate, on Trump-branded paper, with a Trump-branded pen some agreement will be signed that will finally give him his beloved Nobel Peace Prize. I think that in such a construction hardly should we expect that right tomorrow, the day after tomorrow there will be a breakthrough. But most likely we'll manage to throw the ball to Russia's field.
As far as I understand, the situation in Russia is difficult. Whatever they say, however they say it—there really are economic problems there. And they would, maybe, agree to certain points, but I still need to see. I would understand that Putin has some serious concern in accordance with consequences. I don't see this concern.
What's known to me—that purchases of Russian oil, in any case by India, have resumed. China didn't stop them. Yes, prices there jump sometimes better, sometimes worse. But actually what we wanted didn't happen. Moreover, as we see, we're getting all new information regarding how China is helping Russia.
We, since from the very beginning we couldn't, maybe, correctly set ourselves goals, and we didn't find ourselves in a position that we can receive from various sources information important for us—let's say, satellites and so on—we depend all the same on the United States, so we can't afford ourselves the luxury of not listening to what they say. This situation isn't our choice. We're forced to do this.
And the United States can't throw us either, because too much political capital was invested in Ukraine by members of Congress. And this is primarily important, because officials of the Biden administration—they left. And I want to believe that Jake Sullivan from morning to evening regrets what he did. As Clinton now tells how he regrets that he forced us to sign the Budapest Memorandum. I think that someday we'll hear such tears from Sullivan too.
But God be with him. What's important is that today we must understand—everything depends on one person. This person is Trump. And if we feel how to talk with him, then this needs to be done necessarily. And show him that there's no desire for peace from the Russian side, despite some statements that we're in principle ready, but we still want to return to 2021, then they'll return to Istanbul, then to 2021, then some other nonsense.
We understand all this, that all officials who voice this, except Putin, they don't understand anything about what Putin wants. He knows what he wants. He needs war further. He can't leave without declaring victory loudly. His loud victory means our loud defeat.
Therefore, I don't understand how we can force him to agree to a peace plan. At the same time, working on a peace plan, of course, is necessary. We're obliged to show all partners that we're ready. And the correct policy—to attract Europeans. It's correct that they'll be in the loop. But Europeans won't influence Trump. Not at all. You understand?
Lessons of Small States: From Iceland to Singapore
We still must be—you know, when I reflected before our broadcast about how large states interact, and thought—what examples are there of small states? And such a little list came to my mind. Well okay, we'll leave North Korea there, but we understand—Israel.
Let's recall, for example, Iceland. Do you know that in the fifties Iceland waged Cod Wars with Britain? Yes. You understand, it defended its interests, although Britain very much even sent military ships there. Well, where—what is Iceland, what is Britain, we understand. But they did it.
We understand that, for example, Singapore found its place under the sun in its time. It also separated from Malaysia. But Malaysia what, just agreed joyfully: "Well, come on, leave, you know, you've tired me"—and lose the largest and most important port? But there were certain agreements with interested parties.
And Singapore wasn't shy, being an Indian-Malaysian-Chinese country, to accept English as the state language. Well, for example, this is one example. We just don't often talk about this. But I was friends with Singaporean ambassadors both in Turkey and here. And, you understand, this is very interesting.
After all, the British were colonizers of India and China. And at the same time they have the English language, and nothing terrible happens to them. You understand? They found this point of view.
Denmark at one time—is it the largest country or most populated? But it managed to half of Asia—well, not to buy, but definitely there to graze on Asian resources. After all, these examples—and they tell us that small countries, they in principle can also find, if they find the right balance.
For us this is very important. We unambiguously and irrevocably are going into alliance with the United States. Then we need to understand what consequences will be. Because the United States, especially in their current incarnation, they'll demand payment for support. You understand? We must understand—this will be. A bill will be presented. And are we ready to pay this bill?
Or still we must take into account the experience of the same Japan, the same South Korea and the same Israel and still understand that we must have our own strategy, our own vision and ask for concrete help only in that part that's important to us.
But now the situation, of course—well, I'm talking about the theoretical ideal variant, to switch to it today, probably, well, purely realistically I don't think. The United States—the most important state, we're obliged to have very close relations with them on an enormous number of issues.
But at the same time we must understand that for the United States the United States—first of all. This can be written in big letters on all posts that lead to Washington.
Prospects for a Peace Deal: Realism Against Hope
Yuriy Romanenko: The last question, which, I think, interests everyone. Do you see prospects for concluding a peace deal—well, if not tomorrow, tomorrow's unlikely, but already next year?
Sergey Korsunsky: I honestly think that this story will be continued. I think that now we're really closer than ever before to some such framework of what could be the basis for further. There are elements there that look interesting—well, like a free economic zone there somewhere, some intermediate stages of withdrawal there of troops and so on. That is, this is interesting.
But what I would very much like to say, that I hope this will happen—I think that at this stage this is unlikely to happen. Most likely at this stage we'll manage to explain to Trump what our position consists of. And further the ball will fly again toward Putin.
Actually speaking, they already, as I understand, are considering this plan. I think that between them and the Americans there's communication going on that we maybe don't strongly suspect, but it's going on. And I think there's very serious trading going on.
Conversations about mining bitcoins or some other cryptocurrencies at the Zaporizhzhia NPP—they're not just thrown into the air and aren't refuted by anyone, incidentally, after throwing out. How this can be from the point of view of international law, namely IAEA instructions, I can't imagine. This is some, excuse me, nonsense.
Therefore, you understand, to answer your question unambiguously—well, this is simply unrealistic. So many absolutely incomprehensible things simultaneously in the air and simultaneously being discussed, seemingly, that it's difficult to imagine that this in one moment will lay on the table, and you'll see a puzzle that came together, and there's the Mona Lisa.
So I think that this puzzle will come together, but it will resemble rather a Picasso painting.
Yuriy Romanenko: Sergey, thank you very much. I received as traditionally genuine intellectual pleasure, just as our entire audience, especially before the New Year—from your depth, laconicism and consistency in unfolding thought. Therefore, I wish you all the very best in the New Year and hope that we'll continue our intellectual, so to say, cooperation. Everything was very interesting for me to listen and hear.
Sergey Korsunsky: Mutual. Thank you, thank you, Yura, for the invitation. Thank you! Peace to everyone. Well, New Year. Let's still not lose hope and still work together. We ourselves clearly understood what we want and how we can achieve this very peace. So thank you, happily and see you in the new year.
