The online community is enthusiastically discussing a publication in the Bolshevik newspaper WSJ, which describes the dramatic dominance of Ukrainian warriors at the tactical level (!) over NATO military forces.
I myself try not to miss opportunities to emphasize our successes, because achievements very often drown in routine and negativity. But every success must be placed in context, especially one that induces euphoria.
- Some time ago I wrote that NATO wouldn't even manage to deploy its potential without sensitive losses. For which I was criticized—they said I was exaggerating. But if our forces at brigade/battalion level are dismantling NATO troops, then the Russians will manage no worse. This is the main conclusion. And they will definitely prepare IN ADVANCE for sabotage within the EU/NATO.
In a prolonged conflict and at the strategic level, Russia has zero chances against NATO. None whatsoever.
The fact is that Russia is (again) counting on a blitzkrieg. This time—at the operational/operational-tactical level, when the NATO machine won't have time to deploy, and then diplomacy and internal sabotage will tie its hands.
This will be a mistake again, because NATO military forces and European societies, for all our love of criticizing them, will—belatedly but surely—come to fighting trim. And crush the Russians.
Which will mean a prolonged war (months at minimum) with casualties and destruction. And loss of momentum for years, which everyone will exploit—from Beijing and Washington to Ottawa and Delhi.
In view of this, the priority for sensible European military and political leaders is PREVENTING war with Russia. Not victory in the hot phase, but precisely its prevention.
And part of the discussion should shift to this area. Because prevention implies a complex of conditions in the FUTURE. And we avoid (including for objective reasons, so as not to dilute focus from the burning needs of the front) honest conversations about the future.
Because of this, absolutely stupid approaches that don't correspond to Ukraine's interests begin to dominate. Which the reptiloid Ischinger highlighted, where Ukraine is conceived as an expendable "shield on call."
Ukraine will burn and die for another couple of years. During this time Europe will prepare. Russia will assess and be afraid to attack. That's roughly how they see it.
Which is wrong.
PREVENTION of Russian aggression against Europe depends on only one factor—Ukraine's role and place in the architecture of European security.
European armies WILL NOT PREPARE in advance until they participate in a real modern war.
Like North Koreans, Chinese, Iranians, Colombians, and others.
It will be particularly piquant when the Russians throw mobilized forces from occupied Ukrainian territories against Europe. Surviving assault infantry from Donetsk, Luhansk, and over time—from Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region, will outmatch any Buryats and devour any NATO troops. And they'll have fury and motives to spare! That's the truth.
If Ukraine is in a military alliance with Europe and ready to enter the war, the Russians will definitely think twice.
Because they consider Europeans weak. But they don't consider Ukrainians weak. And they already know that with Ukrainians it won't work out quickly.
Therefore the entire focus of their efforts is directed at ensuring Ukraine's "neutrality" (although they try to obscure this with all kinds of nonsense).
When Ukraine doesn't participate, the option of a successful blitzkrieg with consolidation of gains and negotiating fuss looks much more realistic.
An extremely logical question arises: if somehow a ceasefire is secured, what motives does Ukraine have to climb back into war in the role of a "shield"? Especially understanding that in a theater against EU/NATO countries the war could be swift, while for us it will again turn into a drawn-out bloody mess?
And here very practical things begin to manifest.
- We've already developed a vigorous culture of examining present mistakes and certain approaches to correcting them. But there's categorically insufficient modeling through pictures of the future. Which is useful as an exercise and provides certain hints.
Let's hypothetically look through the prism of Kharkiv. Simply very illustrative of Ukraine's trajectory.
Suppose that from March 1/April/May/June.../November a ceasefire begins. The city becomes safe.
As Tetyana Zub and Polina Alpatova showed in their remarkable study (we really need a fresh one on this topic!!!), the lion's share of Kharkiv residents who relocated within Ukraine, and many of those who went abroad, dream of returning home. Partly because they simply want to go home and don't want to be anywhere else. Partly because they have housing and it's cheaper to survive.
Also, over time tens of thousands of city residents will return from the front.
Families will reunite, there will be a stage of boundless happiness, which will be replaced by a stage of realizing losses and determining further life trajectory.
Where will all these people find themselves? Approximately 1.5 million people + some portion of residents from our region and other regions who simply have nowhere to go.
If we proceed from the position that Russia is a long-term enemy, then Kharkiv for the foreseeable future turns into a dead end.
One can replace this with the beautiful euphemism "European outpost on the frontier." But for brevity and in essence—a dead end.
However, a dead-end city of a million with enormous logistical, industrial, educational-scientific and cultural superstructures is nonsense. Which means two scenarios.
Either degradation of the city to an adequate status as a garrison center. Where the army and army servants nest—artisans, healers, wandering artists, brothels and various swindlers. But this is a completely different environment, a different way of life. And a different population size.
We've been through all this. Kharkiv lived in such a model for 150 years until fairs and the University deployed. It's already happened! (c)
Or large-scale politically (initially—not economically) conditioned investments and special legal regimes will be required, which will artificially support multidimensional life in the city, creating jobs and a quality environment.
Many, many jobs in the non-military sector plus modern defense industry—that's key. Without them there won't be the ability to maintain those civilizational superstructures for which the city is now famous.
The second (investments and so on) is possible only on condition that Ukraine (and Kharkiv as its part) will be integrated into the pan-European construction (or construction of several leading countries) on a long-term basis. And a significant share of costs will be shifted to the external community.
Because in a dead end everything is more expensive and not everyone, all else being equal, will want to live there.
Then theoretically one can fight for an outpost in the form of "Seoul." Which implies a whole spectrum of conditions and practical moves.
The most obvious—restoration of airport operations (which is impossible without Russia's consent; they'll have to either be forced or negotiated with).
- What do we have now?
Europe is ready to pay us as a "shield on call." Cynically and honestly. But payment to a "shield" doesn't presuppose resources for maintaining intensive educational, cultural and scientific life in a dead end. Isn't that obvious?
What will happen in connection with this?
Even in peacetime conditions, the absence of work, degradation and deterioration of quality of life will cause terrible disappointment and resentment.
Grounds will arise for the rise of sentiments that are now below baseboard level in the city, but which Russia is trying (unsuccessfully) to inflame.
And in a couple of years, which Russia will spend renewing military potential (Ischinger thinks so), by "igniting" the degrading Kharkiv it will be possible to exclude Ukraine from Europe's defensive architecture.
Europe won't even theoretically have a "shield."
We'll become a problem and won't be able to help anyone. Thereby ensuring the neutrality sought by the Kremlin.
But this is the mild variant. Reality can be worse.
We already see open attempts by Europe to organize direct conversation with Russia. And in the categories of cynical reptiloids this is logical. Objectively—both in Moscow and in European capitals there is mutual interest in renewing cooperation, they will preserve and develop contacts.
In practical terms this can mean that Kharkiv will turn into a dead end, we'll continue to be encouraged with applause about resilience. We'll stand on the wall and brandish cudgels toward the wildlings.
While conditional Brest, Grodno, Vilnius, Narva will regain hub status. Trade will develop through them. With heavy hearts and mental support for the unfortunate brave Ukrainians, not without that.
They're already massaging Lukashenko. Kolesnikova is already proposing to ease sanctions. Well, is there a brain to look one step further?
Now exclaim ten times "this is offensive and impossible!" and let's move on.
If interaction with Russia is possible and even desired for Europe (which writes in official documents: Russia is a long-term enemy), then Ukraine must receive adequate compensation for its defensive-dead-end status. Not Lviv, but Kharkiv should receive it (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odesa, etc.). Institutionally, in resources.
Or inevitably (!) a sense of injustice will arise and impulses to negotiate without Europe and even against Europe.
This is no greater cynicism than voicing the thesis "let Ukraine fight while it's profitable for us."
In this moment, instead of wringing hands and criticism, important positions that must be defended need to be written down in a column.
- We'll have to return again to 2023 and even 2021.
How can alliance and "security guarantees" look in practice? They come down to two tracks.
First. In concrete Germany, concrete France, concrete Denmark and others, laws are adopted that decree for the next 20 years (minimum 7 years, which the EU is planning) to direct through the state budget a certain % of GDP to strengthening defense and ensuring Ukraine's development as an investment in the defense of concrete Germany/.. and collective defense.
Let it be German, French, Belgian business with insurance from their capitals—but it must come here, not throw something over the fence.
Not in the law, not in the country's budget—means fiction. For understanding: 0.25% of EU countries' GDP (without Norway and Britain)—that's about $45 billion per year.
LONG-TERM and for PEACETIME. Not for short-term payment of a "shield."
Naturally, absurd conditions must be abolished, like the ban on using external means for direct financing of the Ukrainian army.
This can be "split" already now for greater transparency. Say, monetary provision for air defense warriors is provided by conditional Luxembourg, DSST is financed by Belgium, logistics by the Netherlands, and medical forces by Austria.
This concept was initially prepared in May 2023 and was supposed to take off from autumn. Partially it's rolling in the format of "shield payment." Which isn't enough.
Second. In the area of Hoptivka (crossing on the border with Russia in Kharkiv region) a beautiful booth is installed. The most unarmed and safest person in the world is placed in it, but representing aggressive Liechtenstein military forces.
With a very clear message: this person threatens no one. They simply cannot threaten anyone, they're forbidden to look toward Russia.
But if suddenly they find themselves in danger from Russia, a mechanism for their protection is launched.
And this mechanism consists not in some aid crossing the Polish border in Lviv region or Slovak in Zakarpattia. "Aid" activates from the Kola Peninsula, on all international trade routes, on all Russian facilities outside Russia, in the global financial sphere, etc.
The concept with 5 booths (Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, Kherson, Snake Island) was proposed in 2021. But was perceived by partners as terrible escalation.
Taking war experience into account, a booth is installed mirror-like in conditional Narva, in which the most unarmed Ukrainian is placed. With the same logic.
That's when it begins to look like PREVENTION of war.
But that's not all.
- Dim-witted demagogues in Ukraine are training citizens to shy away from the phrase "coexistence with Russia." Like betrayal and shame. Meanwhile, any variant of the future in which Russia doesn't magically disappear—is coexistence. And betrayal or victory is determined by the "modality," the content of coexistence.
Now on the table for Ukraine (Kharkiv) there's only one modality: even in case of ceasefire—enmity for the foreseeable future, a moat and crocodiles. I.e., an aggressive dead end.
At the same time, Europe definitely doesn't see such a future for itself. And immediately (!!!) after a hypothetical freeze will begin furiously taking measures to renew presence in Russia.
Because Americans and other wonderful people will be doing this.
After all, it will be exactly like this, won't it?
European partners from a position of high values will justify this interaction in a thousand different ways. For the sake of peace and prosperity of earthlings! They're smart and rational people. Plus they have great experience in this.
Does anyone think it will be otherwise? Think again.
I remind you that only 10 years passed after WWII before former enemies concluded a military alliance (!) with West Germany. Where Nazis en masse simply took a step back, and rehabilitation of the Reich's economic pillars, including those who made fortunes from confiscating property of Nazi victims and slave labor of concentration camp prisoners, began already in 1947-49...
And before that, within one generation's lifetime, there was WWI, where the high sides in dirty trenches mutually exterminated millions of neighbors. So there won't be prolonged abstinence.
Therefore the formula is quite adequate to traditional European values: if Europe wants guarantees of Ukraine's entry into war against Russia, but at the same time counts on renewing ties with Russia, then the entire infrastructure for ensuring this "coexistence" and moderating the process must be deployed in Ukraine. Specifically—in Kharkiv, in Sumy. For maritime trade and sanctions—in Odesa. Etc.
Welcome—restore infrastructure for your headquarters, bring in officials in industrial volumes, etc. We propose to deploy mirror institutions on the Russian side in Belgorod.
China could become a sudden partner in this story, interested in promoting its goods from east to west. For this, shooting must stop, passages in minefields made, and silence guaranteed. This is a land corridor 800 km wide plus the Black Sea. A worthy bonus.
Don't want the Chinese? Well, compensate.
If this isn't discussed, such infrastructure will be created anyway. Just in conditional Minsk and conditional Vilnius.
And this will launch all those dramatic processes I mentioned above. Resentment. Destabilization. Russia will see a chance. War.
The advantage of placing infrastructure for ensuring coexistence with Russia (including tribunals) precisely in Ukraine is that as soon as the slightest de-escalation looms, opposition to defense programs will sharply activate in Europe. They may not reach the level of deterrence. Olympic events are screaming about this.
But we definitely won't climb down. And we'll save Europe from this temptation. Because on all sides at exits from Kharkiv—cemeteries with hundreds/thousands of flags on graves...
Plus in some perspective this will give opportunity to access the diplomatic track of restoring territorial integrity and demonstrating to other aggressors that aggression isn't encouraged, everything will have to be returned and damage compensated...
Any other approach means that its beneficiaries are not only not in Ukraine, but not in Europe either.
Betting on another approach—is a countdown for Europe...
