Analysis of Ukraine's Military-Technical Potential

The history of human civilization, viewed through the prism of geopolitics and the struggle for dominance, is essentially a history of technological progress. A nation's ability to generate innovations, rapidly implement them in production, and effectively apply them in military affairs has always been the decisive factor separating the subjects of history from its objects. This axiom, confirmed by millennia, acquires particular acuteness in the context of Ukraine's modern war for independence.

An excursion into the depths of centuries demonstrates that technological gaps have always led to fundamental changes in world order. The invention of bronze, and later iron, did not simply change everyday life but created prerequisites for the formation of the first military empires capable of projecting power over great distances. A classic example of realizing technological advantage is Great Britain. A small island state, thanks to the industrial revolution, the introduction of the steam engine, advanced metallurgy methods and navigation, transformed into a global empire over which "the sun never set." British dominance over gigantic territories—the USA, Canada, India, Australia—was based not on demographic superiority but on qualitative superiority in means of production and warfare.

Similar processes occurred in the 20th century. The rapid rise of Germany and Japan was conditioned not only by ideological factors but also by unprecedented concentration of resources on developing advanced technologies—from chemical industry to aircraft construction. It was technological parity, and subsequently the advantage of the Allies (particularly in resource provision and the nuclear program), that predetermined the finale of World War II.

The Soviet Union's experience deserves special attention in this context. Despite the totalitarian nature of the regime and the tragic price of industrialization—famines, repressions, exhausting labor of millions—the USSR managed to accomplish a technological leap that transformed an agrarian country into the world's second superpower. This achievement was based on rigid centralization of resources, priority development of fundamental science, and creation of a powerful military-industrial complex. The postwar period became a time of flourishing for the Ukrainian component of the Soviet defense industry. It was on Ukrainian territory that key enterprises of the rocket-space industry, aircraft construction, machine tool manufacturing, shipbuilding, etc., were concentrated.

For the generation to which the author of this report belongs—engineers, designers, scientists who worked in the "golden era" of the 1960s-1980s—this legacy is not merely pages from history textbooks but the result of their own intellectual labor. Participation in creating such masterpieces of engineering thought as the An-124 Ruslan and An-225 Mriya gives moral and professional authority to assert: at the moment of the USSR's collapse, Ukraine possessed potential allowing it to enter the top five most technologically developed states in Europe and the top ten global leaders. However, the subsequent history of independent Ukraine became an example of how this unique capital was squandered due to absence of strategic vision and domination of clan-oligarchic interests.

Today, when Ukraine faces an existential challenge, we are forced to acknowledge: old management methods and outdated approaches to defense procurement no longer work. The world has changed. Countries that 30 years ago were technological outsiders—South Korea, China, Turkey, UAE—thanks to economic policy, creation of special economic zones and zones of economic and technological development, state support for innovations, have reached leading positions. Ukraine, having significantly better starting conditions, found itself in the role of a catch-up player, forced during wartime to partially restore what was destroyed in peacetime.

This report aims to conduct a deep analysis of the causes of degradation of the domestic high-tech sector, assess the current state of affairs in the sphere of unmanned systems, and propose specific, technically substantiated steps for correcting the situation. We will examine possibilities for asymmetric response to the aggressor, refusing blind copying of Western doctrines that are often economically unacceptable for Ukraine, and propose creation of new institutional mechanisms for managing defense innovations.

Erosion of an Industrial Giant

Ukrainian aviation industry of the late 20th century was a unique phenomenon. The O.K. Antonov Design Bureau (now Antonov State Enterprise) was not simply a factory but the center of a gigantic cooperative network uniting hundreds of enterprises, research institutes, and laboratories. Creation of the heavy transport aircraft line became the pinnacle of this cooperation.

The An-124 Ruslan aircraft became a technological breakthrough. For its creation, new aluminum alloys, composite materials, and unique technologies for manufacturing large-scale wing panels were developed. This required development of metallurgy, electronics, chemical industry, and instrument manufacturing at a level accessible only to the USA. An even more ambitious project was the An-225 Mriya, created for transporting the Buran orbital spacecraft and elements of the Energia rocket. This aircraft, destroyed by Russian occupiers in 2022, remains unsurpassed in cargo capacity at 250 tons.

The author's participation in creating these machines, as well as less known but no less important projects such as the An-70 (short takeoff and landing military transport aircraft), the MAKS aerospace system (based on the An-325), and the Svyatozar rocket-space system (based on the An-325 aircraft and modernized Zenit rocket) provides grounds to assert that Ukraine had every chance to become a key player in the global market for cargo air transportation and space launches. The MAKS and Svyatozar systems, which envisioned air launch from the "back" of a carrier aircraft, could have provided Ukraine with independent access to space, significantly cheaper than traditional cosmodromes. However, this project, like many others, remained on paper due to lack of financing and political will.

The main cause of the industry's decline was not so much the economic crisis of the 90s as a systemic error in the state's personnel policy. For decades, key positions in defense industry were occupied by specialists who had traveled the path from engineer to chief designer. They knew the product creation cycle, understood the importance of preserving the design school and experimental base.

Beginning in the mid-2000s, and especially after 2014, Ukraine established a practice of appointing so-called "effective managers" to leadership positions—people without relevant technical education, often with experience in automobile sales or financial speculation. Their task often became not development of production but "asset optimization," withdrawal of funds, which in practice meant selling property, leasing workshops, and reducing scientific personnel. Antonov State Enterprise managed to survive only thanks to Antonov Airlines, but serial aircraft production in Ukraine stopped.

This policy led to a break in generational continuity. Young specialists, seeing no prospects, left the industry or emigrated. Experienced personnel were dismissed or pushed out. The result was that even having documentation for unique products, enterprises lost technological competence—the ability to reproduce this product in metal.

A vivid example of destruction of high-tech potential is the fate of the Orion plant (both Kyiv and Ternopil sites). In Soviet times, this was a classified enterprise specializing in manufacturing complex radio-technical systems: radio communication means for armored vehicles, components for the rocket-space industry, and, particularly important today, electronic warfare (EW) systems.

While in 2014, with the beginning of Russian aggression, the need for EW means became critical, the Orion plant, instead of receiving state orders and modernization, continued to decline. Unique equipment for tuning radio systems was scrapped. Premises where electronics for space were once assembled turned into second-hand warehouses or offices of "shell companies."

Analysts indicate that the cause of such a situation is not only negligence but also a corruption component. "Kickback" schemes amounting to 10-15% of contracts, withdrawal of funds reported by anti-corruption bodies, make honest production unprofitable. It is easier for "effective managers" to obtain quick profit from renting land in downtown Kyiv than to invest in complex production with a long payback cycle.

Parallel to physical destruction of factories occurred a process that the author harshly but aptly characterizes as "debilization of the population." Destruction of the system of vocational-technical and higher engineering education led to a deficit of qualified workers and engineers. Instead of a cult of knowledge and labor, a cult of quick success and consumerism was imposed.

Historical memory of the achievements of grandfathers and fathers who defeated fascism and built the country's industrial might was subjected to revision or oblivion. This is not merely a humanitarian problem. Loss of respect for the working person, for the engineer-creator, undermines the very foundations on which a technical renaissance can be based. Without understanding that we are descendants of victors and creators, it is impossible to mobilize society for new achievements.

The Drone Revolution

The war in Ukraine has become a proving ground for unprecedented evolution of unmanned systems. The dynamics of changes in this sphere outpace any prewar forecasts.

1. The "Bayraktar" Stage (early 2022): At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, great hopes were placed on Turkish strike drones Bayraktar TB2. They became symbols of resistance, effectively destroying columns of Russian equipment. However, with stabilization of the front line and saturation of Russian ranks with air defense and EW means, large and relatively slow drones became vulnerable. Their role shifted to reconnaissance from great distances.

2. The "Wedding Drones" Stage (mid-2022): Commercial quadcopters like DJI Mavic, which ex-Defense Minister O. Reznikov mistakenly called "wedding drones," revolutionized tactical reconnaissance. They gave every platoon commander "eyes" in the sky, allowing artillery correction and grenade drops with surgical precision.

3. The FPV Era (2023-2025): The appearance of FPV drones (First Person View) changed the balance of power. Cheap ($300-500) kamikaze drones, controlled in real time, became capable of hitting targets worth millions of dollars. This became true "artillery for the poor," but with guided missile precision.

Today in Ukraine there exists a situation that military personnel call a "zoo." The defense forces simultaneously have dozens, if not hundreds, of UCAV types on their arsenal. Among reconnaissance—Leleka-100, Furia, Valkyria, SHARK, Spectator, PD-2. Among strike—Beaver, Lyuty, Palyanytsia, R-18, and multitudes of FPV drone variations from different workshops.

Negative consequences of lack of standardization:

• Logistics and repair: Each drone has its own unique spare parts, propellers, motors, antennas. Providing repair units with all necessary nomenclature is impossible. This leads to minor breakdowns taking drones out of operation for weeks.
• Operator training: Training a pilot on one UCAV type does not guarantee their ability to effectively control another. Ground control station interfaces, aerodynamics, and launch procedures differ fundamentally.
• Economic inefficiency: Small-batch production (dozens per month) is always more expensive than mass conveyor production (thousands). The cost of a "garage" drone is higher, and quality control lower.

Anatoliy Vovnianko appropriately turns to the historical experience of the USA during World War II. When the US Army needed a light reconnaissance vehicle, the technical specification was sent to 135 manufacturers. Only three companies (Bantam, Willys-Overland, and Ford) presented prototypes. After exhausting tests, the Willys project won.

However, instead of buying three different vehicles, the US government chose one design (Willys MB) and transferred the license for its production also to Ford (under the name Ford GPW). This ensured complete parts interchangeability. A soldier on the battlefield could take a carburetor from a destroyed Ford and install it on a Willys.

Ukraine needs an analogous approach. The state must conduct comparative tests, select 2-3 best models in each class (reconnaissance, kamikaze, bomber), and finance their mass production at different factories' facilities. This will allow lowering price, unifying training, and simplifying logistics.

Creation of the Brave1 defense technology cluster is a positive step. The platform simplified admission procedures, shortening the bureaucratic path from 2 years to several weeks. Grant support for startups allowed identifying talented teams.

However, Brave1 operates predominantly as an accelerator and marketplace, not as a strategic planning body. It reacts to market offers rather than forming rigid orders. There is no centralized "brain center" that would determine exactly what characteristics will be needed in six months, considering enemy EW evolution.

A critical factor in drone survival is resistance to electronic warfare. Russians adapt quickly, changing jamming frequencies for control channels and GPS. A drone effective yesterday can become a helpless piece of plastic today.

This requires Ukrainian manufacturers not simply to assemble drones from Chinese components but to conduct deep engineering work on communication systems. Drones with interchangeable radio modules, frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), and artificial intelligence elements for target homing under communication loss conditions are necessary. This is precisely where consolidation of scientific potential is needed, not dispersion of resources across hundreds of small projects.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

One of the most controversial government decisions is ordering two Ada-class corvettes (Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi) from Turkey. The contract cost is not officially disclosed, but expert estimates indicate approximately 500 million euros per ship with full weaponry and ammunition complement.

Technical-economic analysis:

• Survivability: A modern corvette is a large, radar-visible target. In conditions of the enclosed Black Sea, which is completely covered by Russian coastal Bastion complexes and aviation, chances of such a ship's survival without a powerful air defense umbrella are minimal. The cost of an Onyx or Kalibr missile (about $1-3 million) is incommensurate with the ship's cost (€500 million).
• Basing: After Crimea's occupation and constant strikes on mainland Ukrainian ports, safe basing and servicing of such ships is impossible. In fact, they are doomed to remain in Turkish ports until the war's end, freezing colossal budget funds.
• Opportunity cost: For the price of one corvette (€500 million), approximately 2,000 Magura V5-type naval drones (~$250,000 each) could be manufactured. It is precisely these cheap unmanned boats that have already changed the balance of power in the Black Sea, sinking the Russian corvette Ivanovets, landing ship Caesar Kunikov, and patrol ship Sergey Kotov.

The decision to build corvettes appears as political PR or an attempt to "master budgets" rather than rational military strategy. This is a classic example of preparing for the last war while ignoring modern warfare realities.

Undoubtedly, Ukrainian Air Forces need modern aircraft. However, public expectations regarding F-16s (as well as possible Saab Gripen or Dassault Rafale) are significantly inflated.

Problems of operating Western fighters:

1. Cost: One F-16 Block 70/72 costs over $60 million. Together with armament, pilot training, and infrastructure, the price doubles.
2. Airfield vulnerability: The main problem today is not so much air combat as preserving aircraft on the ground. Russian ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones constantly attack airfields (Starokostiantyniv, Myrhorod). Western aircraft require perfect runways and complex ground maintenance, which makes them tied to stationary bases known to the enemy.
3. Effectiveness: In conditions of saturated Russian air defense (S-400), F-16s will not be able to operate freely over the front line. Their role will be reduced to carriers of long-range missiles (Storm Shadow, AMRAAM) launched from safe distance.

Instead of collecting different types of expensive platforms (Gripen, Rafale, F-16), which will create logistical chaos, it would be more expedient to focus on one type and invest in strike means for them, as well as in unmanned aviation development.

Technical Proposals for Victory

Given resource limitations, Ukraine cannot afford a symmetric response to Russia (building as many tanks, aircraft, or ships). Our path is asymmetry: using cheap but technological solutions to neutralize expensive enemy assets.

One key air defense problem is exhaustion of expensive anti-aircraft missile stocks on cheap Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Shooting down a "moped" with a NASAMS missile (cost >$1 million) is economic defeat.

Proposal: Using Aero L-39 Albatros training aircraft as drone hunters.

Ukraine and partner countries retain a significant number of these machines (by the author's estimates, hundreds of units).

Technical justification:

Modernization: Installing modern optoelectronic stations or compact onboard radars (on external pylons) on the L-39 would transform this aircraft into an effective "night hunter." This solution would free up high-tech air defense systems for combating ballistics. Unfortunately, this idea is ignored in favor of waiting for F-16s.

Another unused reserve is creating stratospheric unmanned systems (High Altitude Platform Systems—HAPS). These are vehicles operating at altitudes of 20-25 km, above weather phenomena and civil aviation corridors.

Advantages for Ukraine:

1. Independent communications: One HAPS can provide broadband communications (5G/Starlink analog) over territory up to 200 km in diameter. In conditions of Russian attempts to jam satellite signals, this is critically important for troop command.
2. Persistent reconnaissance: Unlike satellites flying over a target once every few hours, HAPS can "hang" over a point for weeks, providing video surveillance in real time.
3. Resilience: The 20 km altitude makes them unreachable for MANPADS and most anti-aircraft artillery. For engagement, expensive medium-range missiles (S-300/400) are needed, whose expenditure on a plastic airframe is economically unprofitable for the enemy.

The scientific potential of the National Aviation University (NAU) and KPI, which already have experience creating PolyITAN nanosatellites as well as developments with solar panels, allows implementing such a project in Ukraine. Startups already exist (for example, Swarmer) working in adjacent spheres, but they lack state orders.

The author's mention of the MAKS system based on the An-325 is important in the context of strategic autonomy. Ukraine has no cosmodrome of its own, and in conditions of Europe's dense settlement, its construction is impossible. Air launch technology (launching a rocket from a carrier aircraft) is Ukraine's only path to obtaining independent space access.

This would allow placing constellations of reconnaissance microsatellites into orbit as needed, without depending on SpaceX or other partners' launch schedules. Although implementing full-scale MAKS is now extremely complex, development of light air-launched carrier rockets for existing aircraft (An-124, An-178) should be part of long-term strategy.

Ukrainian RAND

The report's author cites an example of an acquaintance—a high-ranking official who in 20 years at the highest posts (from Ministry of Industrial Policy to Vice Prime Minister) created nothing real. This is a diagnosis for the entire state management system. Officials work for "those who appointed them," not for the state. Decisions are made chaotically, without deep analysis of consequences.

To exit the crisis, creation of an independent intellectual center is necessary—an analog of the American RAND Corporation or DARPA.

Key Center Functions:

1. Technical intelligence and analysis: Continuous monitoring of enemy innovations and global trends. Analysis of battlefield events not from the perspective of "number of shellings" but from the perspective of "technology effectiveness."
2. Forming "Vision of the Future": Determining requirements for weapons needed in 5-10 years. For example, transition from remotely controlled drones to fully autonomous swarms with artificial intelligence.
3. Procurement arbitration: Independent expertise of large defense contracts. The Center must have authority to stop purchases of obsolete or ineffective equipment (such as corvettes), proposing alternatives.
4. Coordination of science and production: Uniting efforts of academic institutes (NASU), universities, and private manufacturers to solve specific applied tasks.

Such a center should not be subordinate directly to the Ministry of Defense to avoid bureaucratic pressure. It should be financed by the state but governed by a supervisory board of authoritative designers, scientists, and military practitioners.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The conducted investigation of Ukraine's technical progress and defense capability, based on analysis of expert community opinions and objective data, allows drawing unflattering but necessary conclusions. Ukraine, having colossal scientific-technical potential at independence's start, largely lost it due to management incompetence and corruption. The "era of managers" replaced the "era of designers," leading to degradation of such giants as Antonov, Motor Sich, Pivdenmash, and destruction of strategic factories like Orion.

At the same time, war awakened the Ukrainian people's passionarity, resulting in creation of a powerful volunteer movement and hundreds of private defense startups. It is precisely this "grassroots" technical progress that holds the front today. However, without systemic state support and coordination, this resource may be exhausted.

To correct the situation and ensure victory, it is necessary to:

1. Change procurement philosophy: Refuse financing prestige projects (corvettes, super-expensive fighters) in favor of mass production of asymmetric weapons (drones, missiles, EW, air defense, hunter drones).
2. Conduct UCAV unification: Based on transparent competition (following the Willys MB example), select 3-5 main drone platforms and launch their mass licensed production, ensuring compatibility and repairability.
3. Mobilize scientific potential: Create a National Defense Innovation Center (Ukrainian RAND) for forming long-term technical strategy.
4. Reanimate "light" aviation: Deploy a program for restoring and modernizing L-39 aircraft and develop a new Ukrainian aircraft of this class for creating an air defense echelon against drones, conserving anti-aircraft missile resources.
5. Invest in the future: Begin state programs for developing stratospheric platforms and autonomous AI systems to avoid being defenseless before tomorrow's technologies.

The time for "mantras" about the great past has passed. The time has come for hard pragmatism, engineering calculation, and consolidation of efforts for technological superiority, which is the only guarantee of the nation's survival.

Analysis prepared by Ihor Akimov, Chairman of the Kronos Institute of Social Dynamics and Security, based on materials from Anatoliy Vovnianko —lead designer of the An-70 aircraft service, head of the lead designers service for creating the An-225 Mriya aircraft, and deputy chief designer of the An-124, An-124-100, An-225, An-218 aircraft and their modifications.